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UPON ADVERTISING--

In its efforts to combat gasoline price wars and the fraud that allegedly accompanied them, the City of Pontiac enacted an ordinance designed to restrict the
scope of gasoline advertising. It provided that: "No sign or placard stating the
price or prices of gasoline other than such signs or placards as hereinabove provided [signs not larger than 12 by 12 inches attached to pumps] shall be posted
or maintained on the premises on which said gasoline is sold or offered for sale."1
Defendant retailed gasoline; by combining hauling and retailing into one operation, savings of about four cents a gallon were effected which were passed on
to the consumer. Defendant advertised these savings on signs larger than the
ordinance specified: The city prosecuted defendant for violation of the ordinance and the circuit court·found that the ordinance was unconstitutional. On
appeal, held, affirmed. The ordinance was in conflict with Article 2, Section 4,
of the Michigan Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it bore no reasonable relation to public peace,
health, morals, welfare, or safety. Levy v. City of Pontiac, 331 Mich. 100,
49 N.W. (2d) 80 (1951).
The Michigan decision has the support of three other state courts.2 By
affirming the lower court's decision, the Michigan Supreme Court relied upon
the free speech clause in the state constitution, rather than upon the due process
clause.3 This would indicate that the court looks upon commercial advertising more as a personal liberty than as economic activity. It would seem that
the theory of these decisions revolves about the fact that the gasoline retailing
industry is not affected per se with a public interest;4 it therefore becomes necessary to point up a specific abuse before the police power can be invoked. Thus
these decisions reduce themselves to an unwillingness, on the part of the courts,
to allow any use of the police power where there is not a readily definable, pri-

1

Section 5, ordinance no. 985, City of Pontiac, Michigan (1941).
On strikingly similar facts, all three courts found that the restrictions upon the size
of gasoline price signs were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Connecticut based its
decision upon the federal due process clause and a due process clause in the state constitu·
tion. See State v. Miller, 126 Conn. 373, 12 A. (2d) 192 (1940). In Ohio, the court found
that such regulation was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, although it did not
indicate which clause of the state or federal constitution the ordinance violated. Moreson v.
City of Akron, 20 Ohio Op. 298 (1941). The New Jersey court concluded that small
independent dealers have only one weapon of competition, a slightly lower price. Thus,
the court reasoned, any restriction upon the size of price signs would completely destroy
this one advantage and force the small dealers out of business. The court held the statute
to be an unreasonable use of the police power and, therefore a deprivation of property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. See Regal Oil Co. v. ,State, 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A. (2d) 495 (1939).
3 Article 2, §4, of the Constitution of the State of Michigan (1908). This section
provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
4 Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235, 49 S.Ct. 115 (1929).
2
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mary evil. 5 The New York Court of Appeals, following the Massachusetts
court in ruling upon a similar statute, observed that: ''Restriction is implicit in
police power however exercised. The problem is to ascertain whether the restriction, as an incident to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose, is
reasonable in degree." The court went on to hold that regulation of the size of
gasoline price signs is not unreasonable or oppressive and is therefore constitutional. 6 The emphasis in these decisions tends more towards judicial leniency
of the legislative and municipal attempts to curb abuses in a :6.eld where guideposts are few and the path tricky at best. Oftentimes the evil may not weigh
as heavily as the damage which the corrective measures would inilict upon individual rights. Yet, in many instances the line separating individual rights
from a common right to live in a regulated and bene:6.cial society is not clear.
It is within this hazy area that the courts come into conHict, for in essence each
decision is a value judgment predicated upon shifting considerations of the
individual and society. It would seem that while the Michigan decision has
the support of a majority of jurisdictions, the question is by no means conclusively settled. If the case were heard before the Supreme Court of the United
States, much would depend upon whether the Court looked upon the ordinance
as a restriction of free speech or economic activity, since the Court has displayed
an open reluctance to hold that legislative attempts to regulate economic activity
are an infringement of substantive due process.7 Yet the Court has not displayed the same reluctance in the :6.eld of personal liberties. 8 The question as
to whether the ordinance restricted freedom of speech or economic activity would
thus become all -important. The Court has already indicated that it regards
commercial advertising as quite distinct from the individual's right to speak
freely. It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court well might differ
from the Michigan court on the federal question involved in the decision.

Joseph M. Kortenhof
5 Not so in Massachusetts, however. Holding that the legislature is competent to determine whether gasoline advertising, as it then existed, is conducive to fraud, the supreme
court ruled that a statute, similar in all respects to the ordinance in question, was not
oppressive or arbitrary. See Merit Oil Co. v. Director of the Division on the Necessaries
of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 65 N.E. (2d) 529 (1946). An earlier decision of the same court
contained this language: "As the judgment of the Legislature, that the regulation of the
price signs will prevent deception to the public, cannot be pronounced irrational, the
individual citizen cannot substitute his judgment for it • • • • He must conform to the
statutory standard." Slome v. Chief of Police of Fitchburg, 304 Mass. 187 at 193, 23 N.E.
(2d) 133 (1939).
6 People v. Arlen Service Stations, 284 N.Y. 340 at 345,' 31 N.E. (2d) 184 (1940).
7 This is well illustrated in Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 69
S.Ct. 550 (1949).
8 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 52 at 54, 62 S.Ct. 920 (1942). The Court in
distinguishing commercial advertising from an individual's right to advertise his beliefs said:
''We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."

